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HARVESTING A LAWSUIT: CHALLENGING THE ENFORCEMENT
AND VALIDITY OF MONSANTO'S TRANSGENIC SEED
PATENTS
KELLY E. CALDER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The majority of U.S. farmers use genetically modified seeds to
eliminate weed growth in their crops. 1 Approximately 90% of all
genetically-modified seeds planted in the world are patented and controlled
by Monsanto. 2 Through exercise of its patent rights, Monsanto requires
farmers using genetically modified seed to comply with strict requirements,
and Monsanto is very active in enforcing its agreements against individuals
accused of patent infringement.3 Individuals and organizations choosing not
to use Monsanto's genetically modified seed are subject to the risk of crosscontamination between transgenic and non-transgenic seeds, and therefore,
the must take precautions to avoid cross-contamination and potential
Monsanto initiated patent infringement suits.4 Declaratory judgments and
petitions for injunctive relief present potential solutions for farmers who
choose not to use Monsanto's transgenic seed and wish to avoid patent
infringement claims for inadvertently growing transgenic seed. Generally,
this Note argues that these farmers should have standing to bring these
claims.
In the landmark Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms decision,
the United States Supreme Court found that the plaintiff-respondent alfalfa
farmers had standing to challenge an administrative order deregulating
genetically modified alfalfa seeds.5 The respondents were likely to "suffer a
constitutionally cognizable injury absent injunctive relief;" 6 namely, "a
significant risk of gene flow [from the genetically modified seeds] to nongenetically-engineered varieties of alfalfa."' This threat contained both an
"environmental as well as an economic component."8 Although the farmers
* Notes Editor, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, AND NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW, 2012-2013; J.D. expected May 2013, University of Kentucky.

1 Tiffany Kaiser, U.S. Farmers Realize Disadvantages of Genetically Engineered Seed,
DAILYTECH (Oct. 5, 2010, 3:41 PM), http://www.dailytech.com/US+Farmers+Realize+Disadvantages+

of+Genetically+Engineered+Seed/articlel9802.htm.
2See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
5 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2754 (2010).
6

id.
Id. at 2755.
Id. at 2756.
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in Geertson Seed Farms did not receive the injunctive relief they sought,
the case opened the door for other challenges against Monsanto and
similarly situated companies. Some of these challenges relate to
administrative decisions regarding the regulation of genetically modified
seed. 9 Other challenges extend to the validity of these patents and the
respective companies' enforcement of them.'o
In Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto, (hereinafter
OSGA TA), the plaintiffs (various organic farmers and related organizations)
sought declaratory relief stating that they did not need to fear being sued by
the defendant for patent infringement for inadvertently growing transgenic
seed. " The OSGATA plaintiffs challenged the validity of Monsanto's
patents, claiming, among other things, that Monsanto's "patents on
transgenic seed fail to satisfy the requirement of both the Constitution and
the Patent Act that only technology with a beneficial societal use may be

patented."

2

At the time of writing, the OSGA TA plaintiffs currently have an
appeal pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 3 resulting from the district court granting Monsanto's Motion to
Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 14 In summarizing its
position, the district court stated that "[t]aken together, it is clear that these
circumstances do not amount to a substantial controversy and that there has
been no injury traceableto defendants."
Although the plaintiff-respondents sought injunctive relief in
Geertson Seed Farms, as opposed to the declaratory relief desired in
OSGA TA, in some situations "there is little practical difference between
injunctive and declaratory relief," 16 and in others declaratory relief is
considered a milder remedy than injunctive relief.'7 Medlmmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc. sets the standard for declaratory judgment actions and
9 Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2011) (examining
Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 1743, in its decision regarding genetically modified sugar beet
deregulation).
10Complaint, Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11-cv-2163-NRB), 2011 WL 1126563.
" First Amended Complaint at 2, Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co.,
I 1-cv-2163-NRB),
available at
544 (S.D.N.Y.
2012)
(No.
851
F.
Supp. 2d
http://www.pubpat.org/assets/files/seed/OSGATA-v-Monsanto-Complaint.pdf.
12 Id

13America's Farmers Fight Monsanto's Scorched Earth Legal Campaign of Threats and

Intimidation, OSGATA (July 5, 2012), http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs074/I104248386985/
archive/1l 10411137266.html.
14Judge Sides With Monsanto: Ridicules Farmers' Right to Grow Food Without Fear,
Contamination and Economic Harm, OSGATA (Feb. 27, 2012), http://archive.constantcontact.com/
fs074/1104248386985/archive/1 109394550381.html.
15Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544, 556
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (emphasis added).
16Cal. v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408 (1982).
17Alli v. Decker, 650 F.3d 1007, 1014-15 (3d Cir. 2011).
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jurisdiction in these types of cases. 1 Once the likelihood of crosscontamination was recognized as a cognizable environmental and economic
injury in Geertson Seed Farms, it seems logical to conclude that lower
courts must acknowledge plaintiffs' standing in cases seeking either
injunctive or declaratory relief where the plaintiffs are asserting injury
through the possibility of contamination by genetically modified seeds. The
Federal Circuit should recognize this assertion when it rules on the pending
OSGATA appeal.
II. WHO IS MONSANTO? A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPANY AND ITS
PATENTED PRODUCTS' 9

Monsanto describes itself as a "relatively new company" concerned
primarily with agriculture. 20 However, this characterization downplays
Monsanto's history as a chemical manufacturer. Monsanto was founded in
1901 as a chemical company, and even before the controversy surrounding
its patents for transgenic seed and other products,21 the company was
responsible for manufacturing known carcinogens such as Agent Orange
and PCBs. 22
Currently, Monsanto markets transgenic seed to the public under
the Roundup Ready family brand name.23 Roundup Ready products include
corn, canola, soybean, sugar beet, alfalfa and cotton.24 Approximately

18

Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).

19The purpose of this section is to identify Monsanto and the type of products that are

protected by its patents. This is by no means exhaustive, nor is it meant to be. It is only meant to aid the
reader in his or her understanding of the later points of this article.
20 Company History, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/whoweare/Pages/monsantohistory.aspx (last visited January 13, 2012) ("Monsanto is a relatively new company. While we share the
name and history of a company that was founded in 1901, the Monsanto of today is focused on
agriculture and supporting farmers around the world in their mission to produce more while conserving
more. We're an agricultural company.").
21
Definition
of
Transgenic,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/transgenic?show-0&t-1325973340 (last visited Oct., 22 2012) ("Definition of
TRANSGENIC: being used to produce an organism or cell of one species into which one or more genes
of another species have been incorporated.").
22 New Movie
Damns Monsanto's Deadly Sins, GREENPEACE (Mar. 7, 2008),
http://www.greenpeace.org/intemationallen/news/features/monsantomovieO8O3O7/;
Agent Orange,
U.S. DEPT. VETERANS AFFS., http://www.publichealth.va.gov/exposures/agentorange/ (last visited
January 13, 2012) (explaining that the "military sprayed millions of gallons of Agent Orange and other
herbicides on trees and vegetation during the Vietnam War. Several decades later, concerns about the
health effects from these chemicals continue."); PolychlorinatedBiphenyls (PCBs) Basic Information,
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/hazard/tsd/pcbs/pubs/about.htm (last
visited January 13, 2012) (describing that Polychlorinated Biphenyls "were domestically manufactured
from 1929 until their manufacture was banned in 1979" and that "PCB's have been determined to cause
cancer.").
23 First Amended Complaint, supra note
11, at 35.
24

Id
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"[n]inety percent of all [genetically engineered] seeds planted in the world
are patented by Monsanto and, hence controlled by them." 25
The Food and Drug Administration does not mandate that foods
derived from transgenic seed be labeled as containing genetically modified
material.26 Instead, foods derived from transgenic seed are labeled the same
as their non-transgenic counterparts, but if the product was altered in any
material way from the original, this must be indicated on the label. 2 7 Such a
material alteration may include: when the modified product contains an
allergen that is not found in an unmodified version, or if the nutritional
content is significantly different from the original.28 If a product is currently
labeled as being free from transgenic product, it is because the
manufacturer has done so voluntarily. The same is true for any labeling
indicating whether the product contains genetically modified traits.
Monsanto supports the FDA's current stance against labeling transgenic
foods.29
Before creating Roundup Ready seed, Monsanto created
glyphosate, an herbicide, which is primarily marketed as Roundup.
Monsanto had exclusive rights to produce glyphosate until its patent
expired in 2000.30 Roundup Ready crops are resistant to glyphosate.
Farmers who purchase Roundup Ready seed can spray their crops with
Roundup (or another glyphosate-based herbicide) and those crops will not
be destroyed. 3 2 Non-glyphosate tolerant crops suffer severe injury or are
ruined when sprayed with the product.
All of Monsanto's Roundup Ready seeds are patented.34 Therefore,
farmers who wish to grow Roundup Ready crops must enter into an
agreement with Monsanto.35 The agreements limit how a farmer may use
the patented seed, including the primary prohibition that a farmer may not
save any received seed for future planting.36 Monsanto does not hesitate in
2

s New Movie Damns Monsanto's Deadly Sins, supra note 22.

26Guidancefor Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or Have Not

Been Developed Using Bioengineering;Draft Guidance, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/food/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidancedocuments/foodlabelingnu
trition/ucm059098.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).
27 id.
28 Id
29 What's the Problem with Labeling Genetically-Modified(GM/GMO)
Foods?, MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/food-labeling.aspx (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).
30M.TU ET AL., Glyphosate, in WEED CONTROL METHODS HANDBOOK 7e.l (2001) available
at http://www.sumnermaine.us/WOC Docs/Herbicide glyphogen.pdf.
'Agriculture Seeds, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/products/Pages/monsantoagricultural-seeds.aspx (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).
32 First Amended Complaint, supra
note 11, at 35.
33Id.
34
Id. at 43-44.
3 Id. at 64-67.
362008 Monsanto Technology/Stewardship Agreement, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/
SiteCollectionDocuments/tugsample.pdf (last visited January 13, 2012).
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enforcing its patents if it believes that they have been infringed, with some
cases making it all the way to trial.37
Additionally, Monsanto's seeds are self-replicating. 38 As
acknowledged in Geertson Seed Farms, the risk of cross-contamination
between transgenic and non-transgenic seeds is very real. 9 Farmers who
choose not to grow transgenic seed must take precautions to prevent their
seeds from becoming contaminated.40 Since there is no way to examine
seed with the naked eye to determine if it possesses Monsanto's patented
traits, testing for contamination is a mandatory expense for any farmer who
does not want to grow transgenic crops or does not want to be accused of
patent infringement.4 1 Monsanto does state on its website that it will not sue
farmers for "trace contamination," but Monsanto fails to define what this
means. 42
Suspected patent infringement comes to Monsanto's attention in a
variety of ways, but usually Monsanto receives its information from private
43
reporting. This occurs through Monsanto's anonymous tip line, where an
individual may call if they suspect a grower is illegally saving seed.44 Upon
receipt of a tip, Monsanto's legal team investigates the allegation. This may
include the hiring of a private investigator.4 5 A third party will conduct a
field sampling to test a farmer's crop for the patented technology. 46 If
transgenic seed is found on a farmer's property, and the seed is not properly
accounted for, that farmer will be open to liability for patent infringement
and may be sued.

" Why Does Monsanto Sue Farmers Who Save Seeds?, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/
newsviews/Pages/why-does-monsanto-sue-farmers-who-save-seeds.aspx (last visited January 13, 2012).
3
8Brief for Amici Curiae: In Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss at 14, Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (No. I I-cv-2163-NRB) [hereinafter Brief for Amici Curiae].
9Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2754 n.3 (2010).
40 Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 38, at 16. ("To minimize contamination, a farmer must
undertake expensive and burdensome measures at every step of production: 1) having the seed tested; 2)
implementing buffer zones to avoid cross-pollination; 3) paying for extra time and equipment to ensure
that the harvester and cleaner do not contaminate the crop from previous jobs; 4) testing after harvest to
check for contamination from events such as seed blowing from a passing truck (a frequent occurrence
in an agricultural area); 5) paying to have the truck cleaned prior to hauling non-GM grain to market; 6)
paying extra for special storage or storing the grain on the farm after harvest.").
41
Id. at 11.
42
Monsanto 's
Commitment:
Farmers
&
Patents,
MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/commitment-farmers-patents.aspx
(last visited Jan. 13,
2012).
4
Saved
Seed
&
Farmer
Lawsuits,
MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/saved-seed-farmer-lawsuits.aspx
(last visited Jan. 13,
2012).
,
Farmers Reporting Farmers- Part 2, MONSANTO
(Oct.
10, 2008)
http://www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/Farmers-Reporting-Farmers-Part-2.aspx.
4 2008 Monsanto Technology/StewardshipAgreement, supra note 36.
4 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2755 (2010).
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III. MONSANTO AND ITS PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF ITS PATENTS: AN
OVERVIEW

A. Lawsuits and Other Actions Initiated Against Farmers Suspected of
PatentInfringement47
The OSGATA plaintiffs are a unique class, and their assertions raise
several issues of first impression. In contrast, many of the defendants in the
cases referenced herein often argue against the validity of Monsanto's
patents. Findings from these cases will influence multiple aspects of the
OSGATA plaintiffs' action, including determination of how the court will

rule if the merits are presented for debate.
Monsanto appears to be quite aggressive in enforcing its patents,
often seeking treble damages and attorneys' fees from those it sues. 48
Typically, Monsanto will sue farmers who violate terms of the mandatory
agreement signed when the farmers acquire Monsanto's seed. 49 There are
several conditions, but the most prominent violation appears to be
replanting seed from a previous crop to grow for the next one, which the
agreement specifically prohibits.o After it is determined that the defendant
was growing replanted seed, Monsanto often files a motion for summary
judgment on the defendant's liability for breaching its Technology
Agreement. The motion is nearly always granted.
Once the defendant's liability is determined, the only real issue
becomes the amount of damages to which Monsanto is entitled. 52 "4By
statute, damages for patent infringement are to be 'adequate to compensate
for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the
use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs
4 This section focuses on Monsanto initiated lawsuits against farmers, and discusses the
different variables in each, including several unsuccessful defenses the farmers raised. This sampling
was chosen to reflect the typical defendant and scenario present in these types of actions.
4s Monsanto Co. v. Strickland, 604 F. Supp. 2d 805, 821 (D.S.C. 2009) (explaining that
although Monsanto sought treble damages, that a "finding of willful infringement does not mandate that
damages be enhanced, much less mandate treble damages."). Treble damages are provided by statute.
See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2011). Language to this effect is also on the back of the licensing agreement.
Monsanto Co. v. David, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1100 (E.D. Mo. 2006) (explaining that farmer could not
assert lack of knowledge of attorney fee collection even though the language was not on side of the
agreement that he had signed).
4 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("Monsanto distributed
the patented seeds by authorizing various companies to produce the seeds and sell them to farmers.
Monsanto required those seed companies to obtain a signed 'Technology Agreement' from purchasers.
The Technology Agreement licensed the . . . patents to farmers on several conditions and required that
farmers promise not to violate those conditions.").
'o Strickland, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 809; McFarling,488 F.3d at 976; David, 448 F. Supp. 2d at
1099; Monsanto Co. v. Swann, 308 F. Supp. 2d 937, 939 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
s' Swann, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 946.
s2McFarling,488 F.3d at 978-79.
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as fixed by the court."' 5 3 This reasonable royalty is not limited to the cost of
the license per the licensing agreement, but also includes other
intangibles. 5 While the financial condition of the defendant may be
considered, it is not the deciding factor in determining the amount of
damages, or whether any enhancement is applied."
The farmer-defendants have asserted numerous defenses to
Monsanto's patent infringement claims, but for the most part these have
proved unsuccessful.s6 Along with claims of lack of knowledge of certain
aspects of the licensing agreements,57 other claims,
(1) that the Technology Agreements violate the doctrine of
patent exhaustion or first sale; (2) that the right of the
farmers to save seeds of plants registered under the Plant
Variety Protection Act (PVPA) .

.

. permits defendants to

save seeds subject to the plaintiff's utility patents; (3) that
the doctrine of patent misuse precludes plaintiff from
asserting its patent infringement claims
have also been asserted and denied. 18 The court in Monsanto v. Swann
disposed of the first sale doctrine and the PVPA defenses, explaining that
the earlier Monsanto Co. v. McFarlingdecision precluded those defenses.59
The patent misuse defense was also deemed inapplicable, as the court found

53 Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C.
54 Id. at 980 (explaining

§ 284 (2011)).
that these include the benefits of the license to Monsanto as well as

to McFarling).
s The defendant's financial condition is considered along with several other factors in
determining enhanced damages. These factors concern the culpability of the defendant but may include
other ameliorating factors as well. These are: "(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or
design of another;(2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other's patent protection, investigated
the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed;(3)
the infringer's behavior as a party to the litigation;(4) defendant's size and financial condition;(5)
closeness of the case;(6) duration of the defendant's misconduct;(7) remedial action by the defendant;(8)
defendant's motivation for harm; and (9) whether defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct."
David,448 F. Supp. 2d at 1097.
56 CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, MONSANTO VS. U.S. FARMERS 32-33 (2005), available at
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/pubs/CFSMOnsantovsFarmerReportl.13.05.pdf (indicating that a
majority of the data concerning settlements paid to Monsanto is confidential, but provides a listing of
several Monsanto judgments, the largest (at that time) being over three million dollars).
5 Monsanto Co. v. Strickland, 604 F. Supp. 2d 805, 821 (D.S.C. 2009).
5 Monsanto Co. v. Swann, 308 F. Supp. 2d 937, 940 (E.D. Mo. 2003). The defense of patent
exhaustion (or the first sale doctrine) is triggered by an unconditional sale. "An unconditional sale of a
patented device exhausts the patentee's right to control the purchaser's use of the device thereafter. The
theory behind this rule is that in such a transaction, the patentee has bargained for, and received, an
amount equal to the full value of the goods. The exhaustion doctrine, however, does not apply to an
expressly conditional sale or license." 4 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS 111, ET AL., PATENT LAW
FUNDAMENTALS § 20:40.50 (2012). The Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) is found at 7 U.S.C.A. §§
2321 - 2583 (West 2012).

s9 Swann, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 941-42.
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the defendant's claim that the plaintiff implemented a tying arrangement to
be invalid.o
While the previously discussed cases dealt exclusively with farmers
who had replanted Monsanto seed, another case pertains to a farmer who
did not save seed purchased pursuant to an agreement with Monsanto, or a
licensed third party, but replanted seed purchased from an outside third
party. 61 In Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, the defendant-farmer Bowman
purchased seed from both a Monsanto licensed seed producer, and a local
grain elevator.6 2 He did not save the seed from the Monsanto licensed seed
producer but did save the seed purchased from the local grain elevator.63
When he planted the seed purchased from the local grain elevator, he
noticed the plants exhibited similar herbicide resistance as the Roundup
Ready Seeds from Monsanto.M Although the saved seed did not originate
from Monsanto or from a Monsanto licensed dealer, Monsanto initiated a
successful lawsuit against Bowman for patent infringement.
The court denied Bowman's assertion that the doctrine of patent
exhaustion applied as other courts had done in earlier decisions. The court
explained, "[e]ven if Monsanto's patent rights in the commodity seeds are
exhausted, such a conclusion would be of no consequence because once a
grower, like Bowman, plants the commodity seeds containing Monsanto's
Roundup Ready technology and the next generation of seed develops, the
grower has created a newly infringing article."67 The court seemed to find
that public policy pertaining to patents, along with the limited definition
of use rights69 weighed heavily in Monsanto's favor.
Many of Monsanto's patent infringement claims are not litigated
because the majority of farmer-defendants choose to settle.70 Some of these
6 Id. at 942-43 (explaining that defendant's analogy that "Plaintiff's practices in effect
require a car owner to buy a new car every year and, therefore, destroy the secondary market and the
sale of used cars" was flawed, and that they were more "in the position of a car-lessor crying foul upon
discovering he cannot retain the car after his lease expires."). The court defined a "tying arrangement"
as "an arrangement in which the patentee conditions a license to use its patent on a separate purchase"
and that it "is a per se patent misuse." Id. at 942.
61Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
62 Id. at 1345.
63 id

SId at 1346.
65

Id.

at 1347-48 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006) and
McFarling,302 F.3d at 1299).
6
1 Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1348.
61 Id. at 1348 ('The fact that a patented technology can replicate itself does not give a
purchaser the right to use replicated copies of the technology. Applying the first sale doctrine to
subsequent generations of self-replicating technology would eviscerate the rights of the patent holder."')
(quoting Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1336).
69
Bowman, 657 F.3d at 1348 ("The right to use 'do[es] not include the right to construct an
essentially new article on the template of the original, for the right to make the article remains with the
patentee."') (quoting Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
70
CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY, supranote 56, at 32.
6Id.
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settlements involve farmers who inadvertently grew Monsanto seed on their
properties.7 1 Due to the confidential nature of settlement agreements, the
exact amount of farmers named as defendants is unknown. 7 2 Monsanto
provides some information concerning its patent cases on its website, and
although the OSGATA complaint also offers additional statistics, there is
little access to information regarding the amount of farmers who have been
investigated or the number of settlements reached. 3
B. Monsanto'sLawsuits and OtherActions InitiatedAgainst Non-Grower
Entities
In addition to farmers, Monsanto has also filed suit against
numerous other entities for patent infringement, 4 including competitors in
the genetically modified seed market.75 The primary focus of this section is
Monsanto Co. v. Parrbecause the defendant in this case, Parr, is the most
similarly situated (with respect to financial and legal resources) to the
farmer-defendants mentioned above.
In Parr, Monsanto initiated a lawsuit requesting a permanent
injunction against Parr alleging that he induced others to commit patent
infringement. Unlike farmers, who infringe if the seed is found on their
property without the proper licenses, Parr's infringement occurred when he
advocated that the Roundup Ready seed could be saved for future
replanting.n Whether or not Parr actually planted any of the seed was
71 Id. at 40-41. (discussing the effect of "volunteer plants: plants [that] grow from seed that
has not been deliberately sown; typically seeds that failed to germinate in the previous season or that fall
from a plant prior to harvest."). These plants can contaminate a farmer's field, subjecting him to liability
for patent infringement.
" Id. at 38.
7 First Amended Complaint, supra note 11, at 46 ("Between 1997 and April 2010, Monsanto
filed 144 lawsuits against farmers in at least 27 different states for alleged infringement of its transgenic
seed patents and/or breach of its license to those patents."). According to Monsanto, it has filed suit
against farmers 145 times in the United States. Monsanto states that it has only made it to trial eleven
times-all eleven it has won. Saved Seed & FannerLawsuits, supranote 43.
74Monsanto Co. v. Parr, 545 F. Supp. 2d 836 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (indicating Monsanto filed
suit against a seed processor for patent infringement).
7sMonsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 482 (D. Del. 2006) (initiating an
unsuccessful lawsuit against a competitor alleging the competitor infringed a patent concerning a
transgenic com product).
76Parr,545 F. Supp. 2d at 840. ("[S]eed cleaning is a process where a harvested crop is run
through a mechanical cleaner that sifts trash such as stems, leaves, dirt, and broken/split seed from the
whole seed. The primary reason . . . for cleaning soybean seed is to have it prepared for replanting: by
removing this trash from the harvested crop, it is conditioned for planting so that it does not impair the
planting equipment and ensures that viable seed is placed in the ground.").
n According to the court (and Monsanto in earlier letters to Parr) Parr's invoice for his
services included this disclaimer: "As of the date this ticket was printed, the U.S. Congress, through
federal seed laws, has expressly protected the rights of farmers to save grain that they have produced for
use to seed land that they own, lease or rent. Some seed/chemical companies attempt to circumvent
those rights by requiring farmers to sign agreements giving up those rights in order to purchase certain
brands/types of seed. Custom seed cleaning is not a party to such agreements and will, in no way, hold
itself responsible for compliance or enforcement of said agreements." Id. at 839. Along with the
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irrelevant. He gave instructions to his customers that they could do so, and
his instruction could be used to prove his customers followed his advice.78
Once the court found that Parr had infringed, it then determined
that public policy warranted granting Monsanto's injunction. 79
Interestingly, the court determined the public interest weighed in favor of
both farmers and Monsanto: the farmers who do not pay Monsanto's
licensing fee every year gain an unfair advantage over those that do, and "it
is not in the public's best interest to have patented technology pirated in
that such would discourage future investment in innovative technology."80
Parr might consider himself fortunate Monsanto asked for a
permanent injunction - since the $40,000 judgment Monsanto received,
along with any other damages, was forgone in its place.8' But, considering
"the likelihood that any particular soybean crop that Parr cleans contains
the Roundup Ready trait is substantial" because "approximately 87.3% to
94.3% of the soybeans planted in Indiana contain Monsanto's Roundup
Ready trait," it is very likely that the injunction severely limited his
potential client base or put him out of business. 8 2
There have been numerous petitions to the Supreme Court for
certiorari from farmers in these and other cases and all have been denied.83
The Supreme Court appears reluctant to rule on the validity of Monsanto's
patents - an opinion supported by the fact that Geertson Seed Farms did not
challenge the validity of Monsanto's patents, and instead challenged a
regulatory agency's role in the investigation of Monsanto's product and its
statutory requirements. 84 It is unlikely that Monsanto will stop suing
farmers for patent infringement. Apparently recognizing this, the U.S.
85
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari for Bowman v. Monsanto. 86
However, Bowman's petition for certiorari does not include the question of
whether Monsanto's agricultural patents are valid, and instead is limited to
disclaimer, several of Parr's customers testified Parr told them they could save the Roundup Ready
seeds. Id. at 840.
78 Id. at 842. ("Instructions that teach an infringing use of a patented device may be used to
establish that end-users followed the instructions and commit direct infringement.") (citing Golden
Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
9
Id at 844.
8
Id (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 249 F. Supp. 2d 746, 760-61 (N.D. Miss. 2001).
8' Parr,545 F. Supp. 2d at 845.
82 Idat 840. Mr. Parr has appeared in or interviewed for several programs and articles
speaking out against Monsanto. These include a CBS program, Agriculture Giant Battles Small
Farmers, CBS NEWS (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/04/26/eveningnews/
main4048288.shtml, and a documentary, FOOD INC. (Magnolia Pictures 2008).
83See Monsanto Co. v. David, 488 F. Supp. 2d 1095 (E.D. Mo. 2006), cert. denied, 555 U.S.
888 (2008); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1342
(2007); Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 816 (2005); see
also Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 1139 (2005).
8 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2749-50 (2010).
as Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 2012 WL 4748082, 80 USLW 3380, 81 USLW 3028 (U.S. Oct
05, 2012) (No. 11-796)
86Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
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deciding whether the doctrine of patent exhaustion was properly applied.87
If Bowman is positively resolved, it could provide a defense for individuals
who purchased seed from a third party, but it would not address the issues
facing the OSGATA plaintiffs, nor those accused of patent infringement
due to cross contamination. The Supreme Court must eventually determine
the legitimacy of Monsanto's many patents - whether it wants to or not.
Although the OSGA TA case is in its infancy, it may present a viable vehicle
for this form of challenge as it develops.
IV. DOES THE SUPREME COURT'S RECOGNITION THAT RISK OF CROP
CONTAMINATION IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY COGNIZABLE INJURY WHEN
SEEKING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN MONSANTO CO. V. GEERTSON SEED FARMS
MEAN THAT THE RISK OF CROP CONTAMINATION CAN SATISFY THE
SUBSTANTIAL CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT FOR DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT ACTIONS?

This section will explain whether the Supreme Court's language
identifying the risk of crop contamination as a constitutionally cognizable
injury absent injunctive relief in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms can
be used to satisfy the requirements for declaratory judgment found in
Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 88 Undertaking an analysis using
OSGA TA's First Amended Complaint, the discussion will focus on why the
district court likely erred in granting Monsanto's Motion to Dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction using Geertson Seed Farms and its
definition of "injury in fact." 89
Although the OSGATA plaintiffs are seeking a declaratory
judgment, the Supreme Court's recognition that the high cost of crop
testing, along with the higher costs of finding and maintaining
uncontaminated product were "sufficiently concrete to satisfy the injury-infact prong of the constitutional standing analysis" suggests that these
preventative measures could suffice in other standing contexts. 90
Several authors have recognized this, explaining "it can be
presumed from the results of this case .

.

. where a district court finds a

'reasonable probability' of harm, even without an evidentiary hearing, their
costs to mitigate that risk are enough to constitute injury-in-fact for the
purposes of standing." 91 Another law review article author devoted his
8 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 3, Bowman, 2012 WL 4748082 (No. I l-796)("Whether
the Federal Circuit erred by (1) refusing to find patent exhaustion in patented seeds even after an
authorized sale and by (2) creating an exception to the doctrine of patent exhaustion for self-replicating
technologies?").
88 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S.
118 (2007).
89 See First Amended Complaint, supra
note 11.
90Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2755 (2010).
9' Lisa A. Cutts, Case Comment, What's the Big Deal? The Let-Down that is the Landmark
Monsanto v. Geertson Case, 20 San Joaquin Agric. L. Rev. 117, 139 (2011).
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entire piece to the Supreme Court's discussion of standing in Geertson Seed
Farms and ultimately concluded "the Monsanto decision may be cited as
precedent granting standing to environmental plaintiffs who can make a
plausible showing of economic injury even in cases where it may be
difficult to prove an actual environmental harm to the plaintiffs."9 2
The OSGATA plaintiffs claim expenses similar to those of the
alfalfa farmers in Geertson Seed Farms,93 including for certified organic
farmers, the loss of USDA NOP Organic Certification if their crops are
contaminated with transgenic seed. 94 And, as the Supreme Court in
Geertson Seed Farms established, "such harms, which respondents will
suffer even if their crops are not actually infected with the Roundup Ready
gene, are sufficiently concrete to satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of the
constitutional standing analysis." 5
Since Geertson Seed Farms established that this risk was adequate
to maintain standing in a case for injunctive relief, could recognition of this
particular risk suffice for the case-or-controversy requirement in an action
for declaratory judgment? Finding standing for an action seeking injunctive
relief under Article III requires: 1) a concrete injury; 2) that the injury be
actual, particularized, and imminent; 3) fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and 4) be redressable by a favorable ruling.96 However, to satisfy the
case-or-controversy requirement for a declaratory judgment action, "the
question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties
having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." 9 7

92 Bradford Mank, Standing in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms: Using Economic
Injury as a Basis for Standing when EnvironmentalHarm is Difficult to Prove, 115 Penn. St. L. Rev.
307, 310 (2010).
9 Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct at 2754-55. ("A substantial risk of gene flow injures
respondents in several ways. For example, respondents represent that, in order to continue marketing
their product to consumers who wish to buy non-genetically-engineered alfalfa, respondents would have
to conduct testing to find out whether and to what extent their crops have been contaminated....
Respondents also allege that the risk of gene flow will cause them to take certain measures to minimize
the likelihood of potential contamination and to ensure an adequate supply of non-geneticallyengineered alfalfa.").
9 First Amended Complaint, supra note 11, at 36-37 ("To minimize risks, farmers of nontransgenic crops expend effort and expense to ensure that their products are free of contamination.
Certified organic farmers must follow strict standards to avoid transgenic contamination. Additionally,
testing for transgenic contamination may also be part of any non-transgenic farmer's risk management
system. The cost of such testing can be expensive. Another cost by the threat of transgenic seed
contamination that organic farmers must absorb is that of devoting part of their own land to be a buffer
between themselves and neighboring farms that use transgenic seed. This is a substantial cost in terms of
removing land from their organic production.").
9sGeertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. at 2755 (emphasis added).
9 Id.at 2752 (citing Home v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009)).
9 Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (quoting Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
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Some courts have referred to declaratory relief, under certain
circumstances, as being "functionally equivalent" to injunctive relief.98
Other courts have been quick to point out "' [t]he express purpose of the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act was to provide a milder alternative to the
injunction remedy."' 99 Very broadly, if declaratory relief is functionally
equivalent to injunctive relief, then it is possible, if the same factors are
introduced, that what would establish standing in one context could
establish standing for the other. A similar line of thought applies if
declaratory judgment is in fact a milder remedy than injunctive relief (in a
patent context). A milder remedy suggests a more relaxed standard for
establishing standing, and anything that would establish standing for a more
severe remedy would be adequate to establish it for a moderate one.'00
A. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.: The CurrentStandardfor Meeting
the Case-or-ControversyRequirement
Medlmmune established the criteria for the subject matter
jurisdiction requirement for declaratory judgment in a case for patent
infringement. '' In Medlmmune, the petitioner, a pharmaceuticals
manufacturer, entered into a patent license agreement with respondent,
Genentech, Inc.102 Medlmmune, per the license agreement, had the right to
make, use, or sell Genentech's "medical product" in exchange for paying
Genentech royalties it made from its manufacture.10 3 Genentech, after its
patent application was approved (the Cabilly II patent), sent MedImmune a
letter stating that the Cabilly II patent covered the Synagis drug (the drug
MedImmune primarily manufactures). '" Genentech demanded that
MedImmune pay royalties, and MedImmune perceived this demand as a
threat to enforce the patent, either through an injunction or other means."o
98

Alli v. Decker, 650 F.3d 1007, 1014 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing California v. Grace Brethren
Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408 (1982)).
99
Id at 10 14-15 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 467 (1974)). The Declaratory
Judgment Act is found in 28 U.S.C § 2201(a) (2011) ("In a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, a proceeding under section 505 or 1146 of title 11, or in any civil
action involving an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding regarding a class or kind of
merchandise of a free trade area country (as defined in section 516A(f)(10) of the Tariff Act of 1930), as
determined by the administering authority, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking
such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.").
'0Alli, 650 F.3d at 1015. ("The distinct purpose and effect of a declaration, as compared to
an injunction, presents an entirely plausible basis upon which Congress might choose to bar one form of
relief but not the other.").
101MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118.
02 Id at 121.
103 id.
'0 Id. at 121-22.
o Id at 122.
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Medlmmune, fearful of losing the ability to manufacture Synagis, which
represented over eighty percent of its sales revenue, paid the royalties under
reservation of rights, and initiated a lawsuit for a declaratory judgment
finding the patent invalid and unenforceable. 06
Medlmmune's complaint was dismissed because Medlmmune did
not refuse to pay the royalty payments, which lead the lower court to
determine there was no justiciable issue. 107 Since the Petitioners continued
to make royalty payments, there was little risk Genentech would sue for
infringement, thereby invalidating the threat of harm necessary for subject
matter jurisdiction.10 8
The Supreme Court found that Medlmmune did not have to stop
making royalty payments for there to be a justiciable issue - explaining that
"[f]ower federal courts . . . have long accepted jurisdiction in situations
where plaintiff s self-avoidance of imminent injury is coerced by threatened
enforcement action of a private party rather than the government."' 0 9 A
plaintiff does not have to actually be sued for patent infringement for there
to be ajusticiable issue; the threat of suit appears to be enough. 10
Comparing Medlmmune to Geertson Seed Farms leads to the same
conclusion: if the plaintiffs in Geertson Seed Farms were seeking
declaratory judgment, instead of injunctive relief, the testing and other
preventative crop measures, along with the threat of a patent infringement
lawsuit, should be viewed as adequate coercion to mandate subject matter
jurisdiction. After all,
[A]n actual or threatened serious injury to business or
employment by a private party can be as coercive as other
forms of coercion supporting restitution actions at common
law; and that [t]o imperil a man's livelihood, his business
enterprises, or his solvency, [was] ordinarily quite as
coercive as, for example, detaining his property."'

id.
"o'Id at 127-28 ("There is no doubt that these standards would have been satisfied if
petitioner had taken the final step of refusing to make royalty payments under the 1997 licensing
agreement ... .[t]he factual and legal dimensions of the dispute are well defined, and, but for petitioner's
continuing to make royalty payments, nothing about the dispute would render it unfit for judicial
resolution.").
"o Id. at 128.
106

9

' Id. at 130.
0
" Id. at 134 ("The rule that a plaintiff must destroy a large building, bet the farm, or (as

here) risk treble damages and the loss of 80 percent of its business before seeking a declaration of its
actively contested rights finds no support in Article III.").
" Id at 132 (quoting Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 365 (1943)).
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The threat of a lawsuit or of cross-contamination, especially when found
sufficient to maintain standing for injunctive relief, should more than
suffice to retain subject matter jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action.
B. Analyzing the OSGATA complaint employing Geertson Seed Farms and
Medlmmune
In their first amended complaint, the OSGA TA plaintiffs have
asserted preventative measures similar to the plaintiffs in Geertson Seed
Farms to guard against risk 1 2 and the threat of lawsuit, as described in
MedImmune. 113
At first glance, it seems that alleging fear of suit is enough to obtain
subject matter jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment action, even if the
plaintiffs' actions are preventing that threat from being realized. 114 The
OSGATA complaint clarifies that "Monsanto's aggressive patent assertion
behavior is widely known and has been the subject of substantial media
coverage""15 In addition, the complaint identifies "accusations of patent
infringement against those who never wished to possess its transgenic
seed.""' 6 The complaint cites a CBS news story that highlights a couple that
was heavily investigated for suspected patent infringement, even though the
couple maintained they "never intended to use transgenic seed."ll 7 The
complaint also references other farmers who have been investigated and
sued due to patent infringement - farmers who insist they did not wish to
use transgenic seed." 8
Along with describing various instances of crop contamination
leading to litigation, the complaint includes a letter the plaintiffs sent to
Monsanto's counsel, asking Monsanto to "expressly waive any claim for
patent infringement it may ever have against our clients and memorialize
that waiver by providing a written covenant not to sue."" 9 Monsanto, in its
response, replied that "[y]ou represent that 'none of [your] clients intend to
possess, use or sell any transgenic seed, including any transgenic seed
potentially covered by Monsanto's patents.' Taking your representation as

112 First

Amended Complaint, supra note 11, at 37.

'.Id at 47-53.
114MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 134.
." First Amended Complaint, supra note 11, at 46.
" 6 Id. at 46-47.
17 Id. (citing Agriculture GiantBattles Small Farmers,supra
note 83).
" First Amended Complaint, supra note 11, at 47 ("Monsanto's investigation, accusation
and litigation of patent infringement claims against other farmers who did not want to be contaminated
by transgenic seed, including Roger, Rodney and Greg Nelson, Troy Roush, Percy Schmeiser, and
others, are widely known and contribute to Plaintiffs reasonable fear that they, too, could be sued for
patent infringement by Monsanto if they were to become contaminated by Monsanto's transgenic
seed.").
' 9 Id. at 73-74.
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true, any fear of suit or other action is unreasonable."l20 Monsanto, in its
letter, has a similar response to the plaintiffs' argument as Genentech did to
the plaintiff in MedImmune: that the plaintiffs' own actions eliminated any
threat of suit.
Although Monsanto maintains on its website that "[w]e do not
exercise our patent rights where trace amounts of our patented seeds or
traits are present in a farmer's fields as a result of inadvertent means," the
website does not define 'trace amounts.' 2 1 As the OSGATA amici brief
identifies, this commitment "provides no enforceable protection for
plaintiffs." 2 2 These examples and allegations, along with others, permeate
the OSGATA complaint. 123 The fear of suit, which is based upon
Monsanto's past conduct and aggressive stance in defending its patents,
appears reasonable. However, as acknowledged in the district court's order
granting Monsanto's Motion to Dismiss, the OSGATA plaintiffs encounter
difficulty when their situation is further compared to that in MedImmune.12 4
In MedImmune, the plaintiff had a preexisting contractual
relationship with the defendant, and had also received correspondence from
the defendant requesting to commence paying royalties by a certain date.125
The threat of lawsuit was implicit in the request, and Genentech did not
deny this assumption.1 26 In contrast, the plaintiffs in OSGATA have not
received any correspondence from Monsanto stating they are being
threatened with suit. 127 The fear they are claiming stems from actions
Monsanto has taken against others.12 8
Later decisions interpreting MedImmune shine light on declaratory
judgment actions absent a license agreement. 129 Explaining that a
"declaratory judgment jurisdiction generally will not arise merely on the
basis that a party learns of the existence of a patent owned by another or
even perceives such a patent to pose a risk of infringement, without some
.2.ld. at 76.

121Monsanto's Commitment: Farmers & Patents, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/
SiteCollectionDocuments/MonsantoCommitmentFarmsersAndPatents.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2012).
122Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note
38, at 5.
123First Amended Complaint, supra note
11 passim.
124 Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co.,
851 F. Supp. 2d 544 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
125 Medlimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549
U.S. 118, 121-22 (2007).
1" Id. at 128. ("Petitioner asserts that no royalties are owing
because the Cabilly 11patent is
invalid and not infringed; and alleges (without contradiction) a threat by respondents to enjoin sales if
royalties are not forthcoming.").
127OrganicSeed Growers & TradeAss'n, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 553.
128 This was a large point in the district court's order.
"Thus there is no evidence that
defendants have commenced litigation against anyone standing in similar stead to plaintiffs. The suits
against dissimilar defendants are insufficient on their own to satisfy the affirmative acts element, and, at
best, are only minimal evidence of any objective threat of injury to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' allegations that
defendants have threatened, though not sued, inadvertent users of patented seed, are equally lame." Id. at
553.
129 SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d
1372, 1380-81 (C.A. Fed. 2007).
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affirmative act by the patentee" the SanDisk Corp. court elaborated that
"Article III jurisdiction may [still] be met." 130
Article III jurisdiction may be met where the patentee takes
a position that puts the declaratory judgment plaintiff in the
position of either pursuing arguably illegal behavior or
abandoning that which he claims a right to do. We need
not define the outer boundaries of declaratory judgment
jurisdiction, which will depend on the application of the
principles of declaratory judgment jurisdiction to the facts
and circumstances of each case. 31
In the first amended OSGATA complaint, the plaintiffs revisited the
previously referenced letter to Monsanto, explaining the "in terrorem
choice they currently face of either abandoning conduct they believe they
have the right to pursue (e.g. growing crops they wish to grow on their
land) and risk being accused of patent infringement (should they become
contaminated by Monsanto's transgenic seed)."l 3 2 The OSGATA plaintiffs
are essentially alleging that they are "abandoning that which [they] claim a
right to do."l 3 3
This allegation should have survived greater scrutiny under the
Medlmmune analysis, as it also overlaps with the acknowledged risk in
Geertson Seed Farms - that risk of contamination, even if it does not
actually take place, is enough to maintain a cause of action.13 4 This is a
stronger argument than the threat of lawsuit, which, despite being
acknowledged as a legitimate foundation in the context of a preexisting
licensing arrangement, appears to be an issue of first impression here.135
The risk of transgenic crops contaminating non-transgenic crops
has already been identified, and the costs farmers undertake in preventing
that occurrence have been validated. It is especially important when
identifying the non-organic farmers who are members of the OSGA TA
class. 136 These farmers are making the conscious decision to not grow
transgenic seed, but are not certified organic under the FDA's National
Organic Program (NOP).1 37 They are not gaining any possible commercial
benefit that could be attributed to that certification, but are still subject to all
130Id. at 1381.
131Id. at

1380-81.
First Amended Complaint, supra note 11, at 51.
'3 3 SanDisk Corp., 480 F.3d at 1381.
134 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2755 (2010); Organic Seed
Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
135Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 118 (2007).
136First Amended Complaint, supra note 11, at 4.
137See Organic Certification, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., http://www.usda.gov/wps/portalusdal
usdahome?navid=ORGANICCERTIFICATIO (last visited Jan. 14, 2012).
32
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of the financial burdens necessary in keeping their product free from
transgenic seed. Compound these expenses with the likelihood of
contamination and a possible lawsuit flowing from any contamination, and
one may find that a conventional farmer is less protected than an organic
one. 13 8 Monsanto has never sued a certified organic farmer, and as the
OSGATA amicus brief identifies:
certified organic farmers must already answer to their
certifiers. While the organic regulations technically require
only that certified organic farmers not knowingly plant GM
seed, certifiers may spot-check crops and, if GM
contamination is found, require the farmer to take steps to
reduce contamination. Moreover, certified organic farmers
face significant economic losses if they cannot sell their
crops as certified organic, or have to pull land out of the
program. So they would have a potentially expensive
counter-claim against Monsanto for the loss of organic
markets from contamination, making it logical that
Monsanto has so far hesitated to sue a certified organic
producer.13 9
Certification appears to function as a type of shield which makes it unlikely
that an organic farmer would be sued, but does nothing to diminish the
likelihood that a conventional, non-transgenic farmer could suffer suit. This
creates a quandary for conventional farmers who choose to not use
transgenic crop; should they seek organic certification to prevent litigation
resulting from undesired contamination? Organic certification may function
to protect against accusations of patent infringement, but it also forces a
farmer to revamp his entire operation to meet a new set of requirements.140
This type of "forced" decision should meet the necessary coercion
requirement under Medlmmune to merit subject matter jurisdiction for a
declaratory judgment.141
Additionally, an implied reluctance from a particular party to sue a
specified group does not guarantee this group will never be sued.
Furthermore, as in MedImmune, it does not matter if any potential lawsuit is
only being prevented because of a party's own remedial actions.14 2 The
ideal plaintiff would be the farmer who sought organic certification to
function as protection from a patent infringement suit, but a current organic
138Brief
9

for Anici Curiae, supra note 38, at 16.
'" Id. at 12.
140 7 C.F.R. § 205.200-.290
(2011).
141MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 130 (2007).
142

id
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farmer could persuasively argue that Monsanto's aggressive enforcement of
its patents pushed them in to seeking certification.
In summary, the OSGA TA plaintiffs should have been able to
maintain subject matter jurisdiction, as they meet the case-or-controversy
requirements listed in Medlmmune.143 It was incorrect for the district court
to grant Monsanto's Motion to Dismiss on that basis. While a generalized
fear of lawsuit is most likely inadequate, the recognition of the risk of
cross-contamination, and the economic damages that farmers suffer in
trying to prevent cross-contamination in Geertson Seed Farmsbolstered the
plaintiffs' position. 1" Once the costs inherent in testing, along with creating
crop buffer zones, were acknowledged in the context of standing for
purposes of injunctive relief, it necessarily follows that this recognition
should extend to declaratory judgment actions.
The plaintiffs, in describing all of the methods they use to prevent
cross-contamination of their crops, pled facts sufficient to maintain standing
for this type of action. The fact that the majority of the plaintiffs are organic
farmers or organic producers should not have hindered the action, as their
organic certification could be interpreted as a preventative measure, sought
after in part to guard against a potential lawsuit for patent infringement. A
conventional farmer has an even better procedural "leg" to stand on, since
he does not enjoy the protections against patent infringement accusations a
certified organic farmer may theoretically have.
V. THE RIPENESS REQUIREMENT: ARE THE LEGAL ISSUES IN OSGATA
WELL ENOUGH DEFINED THAT A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION
SHOULD STILL BE ABLE TO PROCEED IF THE PLAINTIFFS' SUCCEED IN
REVERSING THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER DISMISSING THE CASE?

The OSGA TA plaintiffs uniquely are the first group to challenge the
validity of Monsanto's patents without either having an existing agreement
with Monsanto or having been accused of patent infringement by
Monsanto. 145 Although the complaint asserts the plaintiffs, based upon
Monsanto's policy statements and past actions, have good reason to fear a
lawsuit if Monsanto's crops are found on their land or they are merely
suspected of having Monsanto's transgenic crops on their land, there is still
143See Id.
144See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S.Ct. 2743 (2010).
145During my research I have been unable to find any cases where the

plaintiffs are similarly
situated to any others who have challenged Monsanto's patents. The context where this has most often
previously occurred is when a farmer-defendant is presenting a defense to Monsanto's accusations of
patent infringement, as discussed in Section III. The district court also notes this in its order stating,
"there is no evidence that defendants have commenced litigation against anyone standing in similar
stead to plaintiffs." Organic Seed Growers & Trade Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544, 553
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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the problem of ripeness.146 Are the legal issues in OSGATA well enough
defined that a declaratory judgment action should be allowed to proceed?
Even though Monsanto has not sued an organic farmer, and this
particular class of plaintiffs has never initiated a lawsuit against Monsanto
before, or been named as a defendant in a Monsanto initiated suit, it does
not render this issue not ripe. Broadly defined, "ripeness requires the parties
to suffer a sufficient hardship that can be redressed through the court's
consideration." 147 The legitimacy of Monsanto's patents has been
challenged before, with numerous petitions to the Supreme Court for
certiorari. 148 It is clear this is not an issue that will simply disappear.
"Whether an action is ripe requires an evaluation of 'both the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration."l 4 9 The first prong is met when "further
factual development would not 'significantly advance [a court's ability] to
deal with the legal issues presented."'"5 0 Hardship is defined as "having an
immediate and substantial impact on the plaintiff."' 5
If the OSGA TA plaintiffs succeed upon appeal, another difficulty
they may encounter is overcoming any challenges pertaining to the ripeness
requirement. Monsanto's patents have been unsuccessfully challenged
several times, although the plaintiffs' attack on the "usefulness" of the
defendant's patents is a more rare assertion.152 "Useful" is used in the patent
context: "[a]n invention is 'useful' under section 101 if it is capable of
providing some identifiable benefit."'
Due to the amount of litigation and research surrounding
Monsanto's patents, there should be sufficient information to ascertain
whether or not Monsanto's patents are useful in the legal sense. 154
Monsanto's Roundup Ready soybean seeds have been marketed to the
public since 1996,' and were likely being researched and developed long
before then. The OSGATA plaintiffs note Monsanto's patents allow it to
146MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 n.7 (2007) ("The dissent
asserts. .
that 'the declaratory judgment procedure cannot be used to obtain advanced rulings on matters that
would be addressed in a future case of actual controversy.' As our preceding discussion shows, that is
not so. If the dissent's point is simply that a defense cannot be raised by means of a declaratory
judgment action where there is no 'actual controversy' or where it would be 'premature,' phrasing that
argument as the dissent has done begs the question: whether this is an actual, ripe, controversy.").
147Greg Halsey, There is a Pink Elephant at Our Patent Negotiation, and His Name is
DeclaratoryJudgment, 46 San Diego L. Rev. 247, 251 (2009).
148See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted,80
U.S.L.W. 3380, 81 U.S.L.W. 3028 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2012) (No. 11-796).
149Caraco Pharm. Labs, Ltd. v. Forest Labs, Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1294-95 (C.A. Fed. 2008).
15oId.

at 1295.

151Id

152See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note i1, at 54.
153See id.
154id.

15 Soybean Seeds, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/products/Pages/soybean-seeds.aspx
(last visited Jan. 14, 2012).
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prevent third parties from performing research on its seed without its
permission, which has prevented some researchers from studying Monsanto
seeds.156 Even accounting for these acknowledged restrictions, the amount
of current research regarding transgenic seed is likely enough for a court to
consider whether transgenic seed meets the requirement of "usefulness," as
defined in patent law.
The OSGA TA plaintiffs encounter additional difficulty when
considering the second prong of the ripeness standard. Whether the
"complained-of conduct has an 'immediate and substantial impact' on the
plaintiff' is difficult to discern in this case.157 The OSGATA plaintiffs argue
that the Court should: "A. Declare that each claim of each patent in the suit
is invalid; B. Declare that Plaintiffs cannot be held to infringe any claim of
any patent in suit; C. Declare that each patent in suit is unenforceable." 5 1
Monsanto has not approached any of the plaintiffs in the suit with
allegations of patent infringement or filed any suits against them. The
plaintiffs have been very open about their refusal to grow transgenic crops,
as demonstrated by their assertions that they would view the presence of
transgenic crops on their property as trespass. 59 Would failing to rule on
the validity of Monsanto's patents have an immediate and substantial
impact on the plaintiffs?
The documents filed in this case do not adequately describe how
the plaintiffs in OSGA TA would be affected by a decision rendering
Monsanto's patents invalid. Some of the plaintiffs have stated they would
grow different crops if they were not under the threat of suit.160 This
arguably hampers how they would run their respective farming operations
because something outside of their control is negatively impacting the
profitability of their business. Seed is also more expensive. The complaint
cites a USDA report explaining "corn seed prices have risen 135 percent
since 2001, while soybean prices went up 108 percent over that same
period."'61 If this increase in seed pricing is readily attributable to the influx
of transgenic seed, then declaring Monsanto's patents invalid may remedy
that concern. At this stage in the litigation, it is difficult to form an opinion
on whether or not the OSGA TA plaintiffs would succeed if they were
challenged on the issue of ripeness, but their chances of success would be

156First Amended Complaint, supra note 11, at 42.

15 Caraco Pharm. Labs, Ltd. v. Forest Labs, Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1295 (C.A. Fed. 2008).
1s First Amended Complaint, supra note 11, at 61.
59
' Id. at 59.
160Id. at 33 ("This fear [of lawsuit for patent infringement] causes some
of the farming
plaintiffs to forgo growing certain crops, including specifically corn, cotton, canola, sugar beets,
soybeans and alfalfa.").
16 Id. at 56.
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improved if they produced examples of Monsanto initiated lawsuits where
the defendants were similarly situated. 16 2
VI. CONCLUSION
Looking to Geertson Seed Farms, a plaintiff seeking to maintain an
action for declaratory or injunctive relief should have standing if they
assert, and sufficiently plead, that they are subject to the risk of crosscontamination between transgenic and non-transgenic crops, all to their
detriment. Any precautions a farmer takes in preventing crosscontamination (such as testing his crops for traces of transgenic seed) can
be used in proving that injury; actual contamination is not necessary.
The OSGATA plaintiffs should have maintained subject matter
jurisdiction for their declaratory judgment action through their assertion of
the risks of cross-contamination and legal action, as each farmer-plaintiff
has alleged a valid harm as identified in Medlmmune (the risk of suit) and
Geertson Seed Farms (the risk of cross-contamination and the precautions
taken to prevent it). The costs associated with testing, coupled with the
vigilance with which Monsanto enforces its patents, should have sufficed to
satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement in a declaratory judgment
action. If the plaintiffs succeed in reversing the district court's decision
granting Monsanto's Motion to Dismiss, subsequent challenges the
plaintiffs may encounter are likely to pertain to the ripeness of their action,
unless those arguments are adequately addressed upon hearing the appeal.
Extrapolating Geertson Seed Farms to encompass declaratory
judgment actions covered under the MedImmune line of cases is not so
extreme, and makes perfect sense when considering the role of private
patent enforcement, and the nature of self-replicating products. Although
Geertson Seed Farms did not apply to testing the validity of Monsanto's
patents, a farmer who, but for his own actions, is not contaminated by
Monsanto's seed should not have to wait to get a statement regarding his
liability, especially if he is under similar pressure.

162 The district court's decision discusses some of the points this Note raises in its ripeness
argument when explaining why it granted Monsanto's Motion to Dismiss. These arguments may be
discussed upon appeal, since they are referenced in part in the decision. Organic Seed Growers & Trade
Ass'n v. Monsanto Co., 851 F. Supp. 2d 544 passim (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

